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A COMMENT ON JUDGE SELYA'S ARBITRATION
UNBOUND?: THE LEGACY OF M c W O N
Step hen J. Friedman'

I should begin with the customary disclosure of my background and prejudices in the area. I was a member of the Ruder Task Force,' but the views expressed today are, of course,
solely my own. While in private practice, I have not personally
represented either plainor defendants in securities arbitrations. However, in my former lives as general counsel of a
large retail securities £innand of a large retail life insurance
company, both of which mere substantial users of the arbitration mechanism, I mas responsible for overseeing the defenses
of a large number of arbitrations. Additionally, as an SEC
Commissioner and later as Governor of the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASDn),I had some responsibility
for overseeing the arbitration process.
I am fascinated by Judge Selya's analysis of Shearson1
American Express, Im.v. McMahon2 and the competition befmeen our judicial system and the extensive and unique arbitral system that has grown up in the securities industry, largely under the auspices of the MASD. He concludes that most of
the shortcomings that concerned the W i l h v. Swan3 Court
remain unresolved. Additionally, he sees a convergence of the
fmo dispute resolution mechanisms. Judge Selya's gloomy conclusion is that securities arbitrations are acquiring many of the
most criticized aspects of civil litigation and that the judicial
system is becoming more streamlined and efficient. This analy01996 Stephen J. Friedman. AU Rights Reserved.
Partner, Debevoise & Plimptan.
See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES
DEALERS,SECUlWES ARBITRATION
REFORM: REPORT OF THE A R B ~ T I O N
POLICY TASK FORCE(1996) [hereinafter

TASK FORCE REPORT].
* 482 U.S. 220, reh'g denied, 483
346 U.S. 427 (1953).

U.S. 1056 (1987).
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sis reflects, I think, a world view from the somewhat conceptual vantage point of an appellate judge. Yet, in my judgment,
the present securities industry arbitral system is uniquely
rooted in the day-to-day facts of the special relationship between retail securities firms and their customers. It is primarily that relationship, with the very "human" kind of problems
that arise, with which the arbitration system was designed to
deal and for which, I would submit, it remains greatly superior
to the judicial system.
With that in mind, I would like to set out for critical exarnination a set of factual and policy propositions that illuminate
the reasons why I believe that both mandatory arbitration and
the recommendations of the Task Force Report remain the
right course of action.

Many investors do not adequately understand investment risk.
Notwithstanding even good faith efforts, it is difficult t o
communicate the nature of investment risk. Individual investors often do not understand the nature of, and ignore warnings of, investment risk. They are commonly surprised and
sometimes even outraged when the value of an investment
goes down. A truly astonishing number of presumptively "sophisticated" investors have difficulty understanding why the
value of a portfolio of Treasury securities, which carry no credit risk, decreases when interest rates rise."

Most brokers are trained and function as salesmen.
Most importantly, brokers are compensated as salesmen-they are paid a commission on revenues. As a consequence, their financial interest lies in "making the sale" rather
than in preserving and increasing value over time. The smarter brokers know that the short-term approach is only of shortterm value, to them as well as to their customers, and that
pursuing their customers' long-term interests is the best way
t o maintain the flow of c o ~ s s i o n s But
. many do not understand that, and their compensation system pushes them in the

' See generally

~NVEEXhfENTCOMPANYINSTITUTE, SHAREHOLDER

RISK DISCLOSURE METHOD (1996).
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other direction. Although the securities laws impose obligations of fairness, suitability and disclosure upon brokers in
dealing with their customers, commission salesmen tend to be
driven by their compensation system.

There are some bad actors as well.
In spite of the efforts of the SEC, the NASD,the New York
Stock Exchange and the other self-regulatory organizations to
eliminate the bad apples from the securities industry, there
always seems to be a small number of them in the industry,
and their potential for causing damage is out of proportion to
their numbers. When I was an SEC Commissioner, a small but
unremitting portion of the enforcement cases involved overaggressive salesmen who had migrated into the securities
industry from unregulated high-pressure sales roles. And the
growth of the penny-stock market was fertile ground for this
group.5
Customer disputes are inevitable.
Notwithstanding the honesty and concern for customers
that characterize most brokers, when the equity markets go
dom, or when interest rates move up and the value of fixed
income securities moves down, customer disputes burgeon.
When dishonest brokers are involved, disputes arise no matter
how the markets are doing. The reality is that customer disputes are part and parcel of the retail securities business.

Many customer disputes are small.
The NASD now handles about eighty-five percent of all
self-regulatory organization arbitrations and about seventy-five
percent of all securities-related arbitrations." That amounts to
about 6,000 cases per year at the current rate.' Of those,
about fifty percent involve less than $50,000 in "realn claimed

See, cg., In re Kenneth J. Schulte, SEC Adminisfmtiue P m d u m , 1997
SEC LEXIS 788 (Apr. 10, 1997).
See TASK FORCE REPORT,
s u p m note 1, at 138.
' See TASKFORCE REPORT, s u p m note 1, nt 138.
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damages (excluding punitive damages). Thus, there are about
3,000 cases per year involving small amounts in which the
feelings of the customer run so high, or the securities firm has
taken such a hard line, that settlement has not been possible.
There is a significant public policy interest, which is matched
by the securities industry's interest in maintaining the good
will of customers, in resolving those cases quickly and at low
cost.

The courts are wholly unsuited to deal with the small cases.
In general, neither plaintiffs nor defendants want to use
the judicial system for small cases unless it is plainly to their
advantage to do so. Litigating in court is too expensive, cumbersome and slow. Although Judge Selya cites some interesting
data for federal courts: most of these cases will be litigated in
state court, where the docket backlog varies widely from state
to state. The Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder: requiring that a plaintiff show scienter to make
out a claim under Rule lob-5, has caused many plaintiffs
counsel to shiR to state courts where the burden of proof is
often lower.
Plaintiffs prefer the judicial system in those cases in which
access to a jury holds out the promise of a large award-and
thus a large settlement. Cases involving potentially large punitive damages are the most common example of cases in which
plaintiffs counsel prefer a jury trial. In contrast, defendants
prefer the judicial system when their position (as is often the
case) depends more on the law than on the facts,'' or sometimes when the greater cost (and the defendant's greater resources) is an advantage due to the defendant's deeper pocket.
When the defendant's case is based upon technical legal provisions, such as statutes of limitations, they feel disadvantaged
before arbitrators who often tend to "do equity" for investors
regardless of the defendant's strict legal rights.
See TASK FORCEREPORT,supra note 1, at 201 (noting that even in Federal
Court, the NASD arbitration process is significantly faster and much less expensive).
425 U.S. 185 (1976).
lo E.g., "the customer is required to read the warnings in a prospectus," or
"New York is a true employmenbat-will state."
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Neither plaintiffs nor defendants should be able
to choose a forum based on whether the facts of
the particular case mean one forum would be
"better"than another.
Because arbitration is a consensual process, those who
appeared before the Task Force who ordinarily represent investors in disputes with securities firms often took the position
that consent should be given only at the time the dispute arises. They pointed out that most securities firms have pre-dispute arbitration clauses in their new account forms for margin
accounts. They argued that the pervasiveness of those agreements amounts to de facto mandatory arbitration, notwithstanding the enhanced disclosure recommended by the Task
Force Report." I agree with that characterization but not
with the conclusion. Once the facts of a dispute are known, one
party is likely to know that the judicial system would be a
better forum for its position, and the other party millknow the
opposite. Agreement is unlikely, and the forum will be chosen
not by consent but by default-that is, whatever forum is required or permissible in the absence of agreement. The rules of
the NASD and the other self-regulatory organizations provide
that, absent a pre-dispute arbitration agreement between the
parties, the customer can compel arbitration, which means
. ~ the effect of
that the customer can choose the f ~ r u mThus
banning pre-dispute arbitration agreements would always be to
permit the customer to choose the forum.
I think that greater fairness is achieved if a pre-dispute
arbitration agreement is signed at a time when neither p m
knows what kind of dispute will arise and who will benefit
.from arbitrationB-whether denying the ability of the securities iirm to assert legal issues and to beat down the plaintiff
with endless discovery d l prove a great benefit to the plaintiff, or denying the ability of a plaintiff to present evidence of
serious misconduct to a jury will benefit the defendant. By
l1 "You either sign it, or they don't want your businessP Theodore A.
Krebsbach et al., Pre-Dispute Arbitmtion Agrwments, 63 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1511,
1519 (1995) (comments of Theodore Eppenstein).
" NASD, CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE
5 12(o)(i)(2)(1996); N.Y.SB. GUIDE
(CCH) Rule 6cc(a) (1995).
" Cf.JOHN RAIVLS, A T i E O R Y OF JUSTICE (1971).
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permitting pre-dispute arbitration clauses we are saying, in
effect, that in most cases arbitration will be better for both
sides. It is better because it will be faster and cheaper and, for
the investors, more equitable than a judicial forum which
would pay more heed to legal technicalities.

The process of judicializing the arbitration process
is at a very early stage.
Much has been made of the 'legalization" of the arbitration process. Indeed, the Task Force Report has a number of
suggestions, including mandatory discovery, that nudge arbitration in the direction of the judicial system.14 But the fact
remains that discovery in arbitration simply bears no relationship to discovery in the judicial system. There are, for example,
ordinarily no depositions.15 Document discovery in most cases
is extremely limited. Judge Selya at one point seems concerned
that the things the Wilko Court criticized about arbitration-the lack of reasoned and written opinions and of an effective appeal, for example--remain defects in the arbitration
system. Yet, at the same time he criticizes the legalization of
the system. We cannot have it both ways, and there is much to
be said for the proposition that it is the very search for exquisite procedural fairness that has produced a judicial process so
cumbersome that ordinary people want t o avoid using it for
dispute resolution. There is no doubt that further legalization
is inevitable in complicated arbitrations. But the Task Force
Report was careful to preserve the old, single-arbitrator,
streamlined process for cases under $30,000, which would account for thirty-five percent of all claim~,'~
and would permit
the same procedures to apply to claims up to $50,000 with the
consent of the parties.17
Similarly, Judge Selya seems to criticize the Task Force
Report's recommendation for early neutral evaluation-not
because it is a bad idea, but because it is too much like what is
used for litigation and, in effect, should not be needed in arbi-

See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 82.
lS
l6

"

NASD ARBITRATOR'SMANUAL 10 (1992).
See TASKFORCEREPORT, supra note 1, at 72-73.
See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 75.
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tration. But arbitration, like litigation, represents a breakdown
in the ordinary day-to-day human mechanisms for resolving
disputes. Both sides are often angry and insulted. It is not a
criticism of the arbitration process that third-party intervention can be useful in helping the parties to resolve the dispute
outside of an adversary process.
In sum, it is simply not the case that the Hotelling Paradox has driven the courts and arbitration into a situation
where "distinctions blur, and me are left with one dish that,
while edible, retains none of the spices that distinguished the
two prede~essors."'~The fact is that in most cases, all parties
recognize that arbitration remains faster, cheaper and generally more fair-and all parties prefer it, except in particular
cases in which the judicial system presents more individual
advantage.

Arbitration is a place to go to have your rights determined.
Finally, and perhaps most important, too many Americans
do not regard the courts as a place where it is possible to go to
have their rights determined. And the determination of those
rights is the most fundamental social function of the courts.
Indeed, the pressure for settlement from judges is fierce and
sends a clear message to litigants about the attitude of the
courts toward performing this basic function. In the brokercustomer environment, in which disputes are bound to arise,
there is thus a critical social function served by an institution
provided to determine those rights relatively quickly and inexpensively. Arbitration, although heavily subsidized by the securities industry, is generally perceived as a fair process to
achieve that end.'g

Is Bruce hf. Selya, ArbiMwn Unbound?: The Legacy of hlchlnhon, 62 BROOK.
L. REV. 1433, 1447 (1996).
l9 See U m D STATES
GENERAL
ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, ~ECWTLESARBITRATION:
HOW INVESTORS FARE31 (GAOIGGD-92-74) (May 1992).
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